Bung the gap: narrowing Global North – Global South bias inmeasuring academic excellence by weighting with academic capital by Demeter, Marton
 
Address for Correspondence: Marton Demeter, email: demeter[at]komejournal.com 
Article received on the 2nd December, 2019. Article accepted on the 18th December, 2019.                                  

















Department of Social Communication, National University of Public Service, HUNGARY 
 
 
Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of three modes of assessing academic scholars’ 
productivity, based on their education history and their publication output. The sample consists 
of the career paths of 231 authors from the Global South that includes the places of their BA, 
MA and Ph.D. education and their production in terms of the number of their Scopus-indexed 
articles. The analysis found that there is no general rule determines that Global North education 
would result in higher productivity, and the paper will argue that favoring productive authors 
without Global North education would be not just ethical but also deliberately reasonable in the 
restricted sense of instrumental reason.   
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Despite considerable modifications that occurred during the history of modern science in the 
last decades, the publish or perish paradigm remained inviolate (Erren, Shaw and Morfeld, 
2016). One of the most important conditions for international success represented in tenure and 
hiring decisions is based on high-quality publications in leading peer-reviewed journals 
(Zdenek, 2018). One could presume that the more talented and hardworking a scholar is, the 
more publications of high quality she will have, but empirical data contradict to this assumption 
by presenting evidence on serious inequalities. The assumption would be, in the case of a 
sufficiently merit-based field, that talent and diligence will lead to research excellence which 
could be measured in publication output. Contrariwise, one could conclude from research 
excellence to the diligence and talent of the candidate. Some researchers add the role of good 
fortune (Frankl, 2017), but this current paper prefers to call it structural inequality.  
Sociologists of science found that the world of the academy is full of invisible colleges 
(Price, 1965), and non-academic factors like geographical position, political and economic 
issues (Shenhav, 1986) or cultural and epistemic differences (Toth, 2012) play a crucial role in 
publication possibilities. Academic inequalities of these shorts divide the world of science into 
two domains: there are successful countries that have leading periodicals and many papers in 
them, and there are the so-called Matthew countries (Bonitz, Bruckner and Scharnhorst, 1997) 
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that do not have highly visible journals, neither have they significant number of authors that 
publish in leading periodicals (Zanotto, Haeffner, and Guimaraes, 2016). The typical Matthew 
countries are those from the Global South (GS) including Africa, the developing Asia (China, 
India, Malaysia, just to mention the most important ones), South America, the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe (with Russia), while the winner countries are those from the Global North (GN) 
including developed Asia (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), North America, Israel and 
Western Europe (Demeter, 2017; Lauf, 2005). Scholars from Matthew countries get, typically, 
fewer citations for their articles, their odds for publishing in top-tier international journals is 
far below than those of their GN colleagues, not to mention their prospects of being a best-
seller, academic authors.  As Heilbron and his colleagues put it, “virtually all of the most cited 
scholars in the social and human sciences were born and have worked in western countries” 
(Heilbron et al, 2018, p. 7). Even the name Matthew-country refers to the so-called rich get 
richer or Matthew-effect that, as a paraphrase for the Biblical verse in the gospel of Matthew 
(“for to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who 
has not, even what he has will be taken away”) says that GN authors will be more cited than 
their GS colleagues irrespectively of the fact that they were published in the same journal and 
in the very same issue. The phenomenon of this serious inequality between central and 
peripheral regions of academe are well known, and often treated as trivial and unproblematic: 
 
The current status of the academic communities at the center is, at least for the 
immediate future, an immutable reality of the world knowledge system. 
Universities in developing countries and their academic communities must 
function in the unequal world of centers and peripheries. Peripherality does not 
mean that academics in the developing world cannot do creative scientific or 
intellectual work, or that they are forever relegated to a subordinate status in 
academe. It does mean that they will seldom be at the frontiers of world science 
and will not share in the control over the main levers of academic power 
worldwide. (Altbach, 2003, p. 4.) 
 
Current research also shows that inequalities between the publication achievement of the GN 
and the GS are much bigger in social sciences and in humanities than in the case of natural 
sciences, life sciences or mathematics (Gumpenberger et al, 2016; Moody, 2004). It is not 
surprising, however, if we consider that epistemic, cultural and regional differences – not to 
mention language issues – matter mostly in social sciences and in humanities, while they are 
not quite as important in mathematics, physics or life sciences.  A recent study shows that 
amongst social sciences, the GN – GS inequality (in terms of publication biases) is the most 
significant in the case of communication studies There is less GN/GS bias in philosophy and 
in hard sciences, and the most balanced picture could be found in the case of engineering, where 
the aforementioned cultural, epistemic and regional differences do not play determining roles. 
Engineering is the only discipline in Scopus, where not a GN region, but China leads the global 
academic field by delivering more than one-third of the total publication output. China is 
followed by the US (13%), India (6%), Korea (5%), Japan (5%) and the UK (5%). As contrasted 
with engineering, the GN is the absolute leader of science output in both natural and hard 
sciences with the difference that there is a greater Western European contribution in hard 
sciences than in the soft sciences where the United States is the absolute ‘winner takes all’ 
country (Demeter, 2018; 2019).  
In order to raise the visibility of their scientific achievements, GS scholars often try to win 
GN affiliation (Lee and Kuzhabekova, 2017). Mobility, that is, being educated or work abroad 
raises the symbolic or academic capital of researchers (Bourdieu, 1988; 1998; 2004) in a great 
extent, while immobility often results in narrowed career paths. The motivations behind 
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mobility include simply economic features like higher salary or better material-technical 
conditions, but research shows that the promotion of scientific visibility – growth in publication 
output, co-authored international publications or the increase of citation indices – also play a 
very important role (Asheulova and Dushina, 2014; Aksnes et al, 2013). Since mobility is the 
most important factor when GS academics wish to raise their academic capital, it is expected 
that more mobile authors will collect more capital. Amongst the most obvious examples of 
“entry-level” (Bourdieu, 2004) academic capital like BA, MA or PhD degrees accomplished in 
the GN, scientists could collect advanced types of capital in the form of GN postdoctoral 
research experience, international grants, GN affiliations (Shen et al, 2018) and, mostly, 
publications in leading periodicals (Cole, 1967; Hanssen et al, 2017). But, as this paper will 
show later, GS authors face serious disadvantages when they apply for positions at GN 
institutions, since GN education experience often goes for academic capital in itself, and GN 
education is presumably added to the publication output, too. With this “double counting”, GS 
candidates must be extraordinary productive in order to be taken into account in terms of hiring, 
because they have to compensate for their GS education.  This present paper will show that 
academic capital (GN education) and academic production (publication output) could be 
calculated in at least three different ways, and these different ways of calculations significantly 
modify the ranks of applicants. This article will also make the case for using the GS-weighted 
calculation which favors the most productive GS educated candidates against their equally (or 
worse) productive GN educated competitors. But first of all, the analysis has to differentiate 
academic capital from academic production to make later calculations conceptually clear.  
Bourdieu’s notion of capital could be roughly conceived as the extension of the economic sense 
of the concept, since 
 
Bourdieu's purpose is to extend the sense of the term "capital" by employing it 
in a wider system of exchanges whereby assets of different kinds are transformed 
and exchanged within complex networks or circuits within and across different 
fields. He is attempting to relocate the narrow instance of mercantile exchange 
away from economics into wider anthropology of cultural exchanges and 
valuations of which the economic is only one (though the most fundamental) 
type. It is important to note, however, that other forms of capital such as cultural 
and social can be seen as "transubstantiated" forms of economic capital. 
(Grenfell, 2008, p. 102). 
 
Thus, academic capital is a symbolic capital that could be accumulated in the form of 
certifications, degrees, fellowships, research grants and work experience. Academic capital that 
has been collected in the top of the hierarchy (typically, in the US and other English-speaking 
countries) is much more valuable than those collected in rather peripheral countries (Bauder, 
2015; Bauder et al, 2017). Thus, academic capital is generally measured in terms of BA, MA 
and Ph.D. certifications from GN countries. As opposed to academic capital, academic 
production is measured by the number of high-quality publications. Since, especially in social 
sciences and humanities, leading journals are published at the GN almost without exception 
(Altbach, 2003; Demeter, 2019), academic production refers to the number of GN publications 
generally indexed in prestigious international science databases like Scopus or Web of Science 
SSCI list (Astaneh and Masoumi, 2017). But, as the paper will argue later, academic capital 
should be allegedly incorporated in academic production, because the main role of every capital 
(including academic capital) is to boost production (Johnston and Schluter (2017). Thus, a 
candidate A with GS education (less capital) who has the same production as her competitor B 
with GN education (more capital) is much more productive than candidate B, since the former 
made the same production with less capital. Otherwise, one should say that GN education could 
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not be conceived as academic capital since it does not boost the productivity of an equally 
productive candidate.  Based on the above-mentioned assumptions this paper argues that 
productivity is the quotient of production (measured in the number of high-quality articles) and 
capital (measured in GN degrees and experience).  
 
i. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠)
𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝐺𝑁 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)+1
 
However sensible is that selection committees should use the above-mentioned formula when 
assessing candidates’ merits in most cases, the rather opposite calculation is being used when 
GN education is added as a surplus to measured production (Cook, 2009; Evers et al, 2005). It 
is a fairly detrimental way of calculating productivity since it is well known that not education 
in itself but rather pre-selection productivity is the main factor in predicting future publication 
success (Kaiser and Pratt, 2016). Thus, the best predictor of future success is a prior success in 
publishing academic research – and not education per se. As the same authors put it, “like it or 
not, peer-reviewed publications are the ‘currency of the business,’ and they tend to dominate 
articles about faculty rankings more than anything else.” (Kaiser and Pratt, 2016, p. 439). Other 
authors like Génova, Astudillo, and Fraga (2015) or Kekale (2018) also argue that published 
academic papers are, in principle, the currency of science.  
Since hiring new fellows is a serious investment, “it is not surprising that the topic of 
employee recruitment has attracted considerable attention. In fact, as employers are becoming 
more strategic with regard to talent management, the importance attached to recruitment has 
increased” (Schmitt, 2012, p. 68). Herschberg, Benschop, and Bring (2018) argue that 
excellence became the main criterion in staff selection decisions, and they also state that this 
research excellence could and should be gauged in an objective, neutral and merit-based 
manner. But the same authors also put that only a few selection committee members question 
traditional selection criteria, and with this mentality, they limit the pool of candidates – and it 
could lead to the exclusion of many talented scholars. For example, international experience is 
usually narrowed to those attained in a limited number of countries, so mostly the English-
speaking research universities of the GN are valued. Since this process premiates GN educated 
candidates (without reference to their production) it often excludes more productive but GS 
educated applicants (Altbach, 2004).  Selection committee members could make inferences 
even about the candidates’ level of English, which can put applicants of certain nationalities at 
more of a disadvantage than others (Herschberg, Benschop and Bring, 2018). Behtoui and 
Leivistad (2019) also observed that GS applicants are more likely to remain unemployed, and 
even if they are employed, they would get lower positions than their GN peers. This all above-
mentioned phenomena causes serious disadvantages to not just GS academics but to science 
itself, because they make tough barriers to the flow of international talent.  
Based on current research on this topic, this paper assumes that GN educated candidates 
are unjustly favored over their GS educated competitors if selection committees will overrate 
their productivity based on their GN academic capital. Thus the hypothesis of the article is that  
 
H1 if selection committees would replace the GN-weighted calculation with its GS-weighted 
variant, the rank of candidates would significantly transform and it would give a chance 





Since former research shows that the most extreme bias towards academics from the GS could 
be found in communication studies (Demeter, 2019), this present research chose this particular 
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field for the analysis of publication success. First, all the communication journals from the first 
quartile (Q1) of Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science SSCI list were selected. With this, the 
sample consists of 19 periodicals (Table 1). Second, national diversity measures for each 
journal from 2013 to 2017 were made. National diversity measure shows the diversity of a 
given periodical in terms of the percentage of authors with affiliations of different countries or, 
in this present example, of different world regions. Only research papers were analyzed (n = 
3910) since they are usually considered as the most valuable publications in terms of science 
output. Third, those articles that had been published, or at least co-authored by GS author(s) 
were systematically selected. As a result, the sample consisted of 263 GS papers. A GS paper 
means an article that has been submitted from a GS institution and this information was 
indicated on the author info part of the paper. Therefore, the labels ‘GS author’ and ‘GS paper’ 
refer to the nationality of the submission’s affiliation only, not to the country of origin of the 
corresponding author(s). As a result, 426 (co)authors from GS affiliations were selected. As a 
next step, the cv-s of each author were selected from their official academic sites (official site 
of their departments or institutions, academic social media sites like Academia.edu, 
Researchgate, LinkedIn, Mendeley and Escavador). Then the so-called academic milestones of 
the authors considered as science capital (BA, MA, and Ph.D. degrees) and the number of their 
Scopus-indexed articles considered as science production were recorded. The science 
production of an author refers to the total number of their Scopus indexed articles so it is not 
restricted to the analyzed time period. It means that authors with science production = 1 
published only one Scopus indexed article in their course of academic life. Since only clear and 
assured data were registered, those authors with missing information were deleted. As a result, 
our sample consists of 315 GS authors with complete and appropriate data. In some cases (n = 
14) the list has the same author twice, but in these cases, their productivity indices were listed 
only once. So, for example, authors with 2 occurrences were registered only once with their 
corresponding productivity indices. In the course of this empirical research, the analysts aimed 
to work with as accurate data as it was possible, so only certified data regarding the career paths 
of the different authors were recorded. If it was possible, the official web page of the author’s 
affiliation was used. If it was not possible, the author’s cv was found on professional academic 
social media sites like ResearchGate,  Academia.edu, LinkedIn or Mendeley. If the data was 
defecting, unclear or the CV of the author was completely missing, the corresponding author 
was clustered to the N/A category. As a result, 110 authors (26% of the original sample) was 
registered without appropriate data. It means that the current analysis is representative to only 
those authors with clear and certified data. It can be assumed, however, that authors with 
missing resumes are not on the top of the discipline, in other words, they have, presumably, 
low publication output irrespectively from their education history. Consequently, their missing 
or presence on the lists of this paper would not likely to affect the top of the rankings. 
This research aimed to show power relations in the top of the field, that is why the most 
selective Web of Science was used instead of Scopus. But the analysis aimed to be also detailed, 
that is why Scopus was used when calculating the number of articles of a given individual. In 
other words, journal selection was conducted in regard to prestige (Web of Science), and 
publication measurement was conducted in regard to a more detailed picture since the average 
number of Scopus indexed articles is much greater than that of the Web of Science indexed 
articles.   
Considering the place of the BA, MA and Ph.D. education of the authors as science capital 
and their numbers of Scopus-indexed articles as science production, different measurements 
regarding their weighted productivity were taken. Their normal productivity (NORM) is equal 
with their production: in this case, education was considered as irrelevant as regards the 
measured productivity, or, more precisely, as incorporated in the production. Their GN-
weighted productivity has been calculated as follows. Each type of science capital (BA, MA, 
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and Ph.D.) which has been earned at a GN university gives 10% (in case of GN10) or 20% (in 
case of GN20) surplus to normal productivity. Thus, for example, if an author A has 10 Scopus-
indexed articles and she has a GS BA and a GS MA, then her GN10 and GN20 will be 12 and 
14 accordingly (10 x (1 + 0.1 + 0.1)) and (10 x (1 + 0.2 + 0.2)). On the contrary, the GS-
weighted productivity index premiates GS science capital, so GS BA, MA, and Ph.D. will 
increase the normal productivity of a given author. Accordingly, if an author B has 10 Scopus-
indexed articles and she has GS BA, MA and PhD degrees, then her GS10 and GS20 indices 
will be 13 (10 x (1 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.1)) and 16 (10 x (1 + 0.2 + 0.2 + 0.2), see Table 1). With 
this, she could overtake many of her competitors with a similar number of published papers but 
GN degrees. This paper will cover the significance of these different calculations in details in 
the discussion part.  
 
Table 1 Calculations for different measurements. Percentages should be added together and 
then it should be multiplied by the number of articles.  
 
 GN BA GN MA GN PhD GS BA GS MA GS PhD 
NORM 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GN10 + 10% + 10% + 10% 0 0 0 
GN20 + 20% + 20% + 20% 0 0 0 
GS10 0 0 0 + 10% + 10% + 10% 





Table 2 shows the analyzed journals and the amount of the GS articles in them. As it can be 
seen, generally speaking, the GS content is under 10 percent almost everywhere, and it is not 
unusual that a journal has less than 5 percent of GS articles.  
 
Table 2 The analyzed sample of WoS SSCI journals with the number and percentages of GS 
articles and the science capital of the GS authors 
 
       











New Media & Society 475 32 6,7 20 66 71 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 173 17 9,8 9 55 86 
Journal of Communication 268 15 5,5 11 78 89 
Media Psychology 114 5 4,3 33 60 73 
Communication Research 223 5 2,2 25 25 50 
Journal of Advertising 182 11 6 30 40 60 
Communication Theory 110 4 3,6 100 100 100 
Information, Communication & Society 431 24 5,5 17 22 28 
Public Understanding of Science 336 26 7,7 11 28 50 
Political Communication 149 2 1,3 100 100 100 
International Journal of Advertising 191 17 8,9 15 50 55 
Comunicar   201 53 26 4 12 26 
IEEE Transactions of Professional Communication 93 11 11 17 53 53 
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Technical Communication 77 3 3,8 0 0 0 
Journal of Advertising Research 189 6 3,1 30 55 30 
Journalism Studies 306 22 7,1 19 41 32 
Research on Language and Social Interaction 103 3 2,9 33 66 66 
Science Communication 169 7 4,1 14 29 86 
Communication Monographs 120 0 0 0 0 0 
       
sum 3910 263 6,7 27 49 59 
 
 
As demonstrated here, even those from the GS who succeed in publishing in leading periodicals 
had their education – at least partly – in the GN. Thus 27% of GS authors had their BA from 
GN universities, and this amount increases to 49% on MA and 59% on the PhD level. There 
are five periodicals in which more than 85% of the GS authors have their Ph.D. from GN 
universities, while two journals – Communication Theory and Political Communication – have 
exclusively GN educated GS authors who have BA, MA and Ph.D. degrees from the West.  
When the analysis is looking for possible correlations between GN education and the 
success in publication output it founds that there were no significant correlations in any 
directions. The results were r= –0.012 for GN BA and productivity at p < 0.05 (P-value = 
0.856), r= 0.057 for GN MA and productivity at p < 0.05 (P-value = 0.388), r= 0.077 for GN 
PhD and productivity at p < 0.05 (P-value = 0.243), and r= 0.053 for GN “BA+MA+PhD” and 
productivity at p < 0.05 (P-value = 0.417). In all cases, the positive correlation between the GN 
education of GS scholars and their future success in terms of publication output was not 
significant (or even slightly negative): nor BA, MA or Ph.D. degrees, neither their combination 
results in a greater number of Scopus-indexed articles. These results mean that there is no 
general rule that determinates that GN education (in any level) would necessarily boost 
someone’s science output in terms of the number of Scopus-indexed articles. For this reason, 
the analysis should turn the career trajectories of the individual researchers.  
Figure 1 shows the science production measures of the normal calculation (NORM). The 
horizontal axis shows the number of authors with the appropriate production, while the vertical 
axis shows the production (the number of Scopus-indexed articles). It can be seen that this is a 
consistently decreasing curve with a small number of authors with extraordinary productivity 
and an abundance of authors with 1-5 papers. The productivity of a given author is the same as 
their production numbers in NORM since this is a non-weighted calculation. This paper will 
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Fig 1 The non-weighted productivity indices of GS authors (NORM) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the modification of NORM when the calculation starts to weight productivity 
indices with GN capital. It means that authors with GN education could overtake authors with 
the same publication output but without the corresponding GN capital. The maximum amount 
of the overtaking depends on the weighting percentage: with +10% / capital type, a maximum 
jump of 12 places were found, while with +20% / capital type it was 21 places. It means, for 
example, that after a GN20 weighting, candidate B on the 31st place of the NORMAL shortlist 
could actually overtake candidate A who was on the 10th place in spite of the fact that candidate 
A has much more Scopus-indexed publications. Waves on the curve refer to position shifts in 
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By contrast, Fig 3 shows the modification of NORM when the calculation starts to weight 
productivity indices with GS capital. It means that authors with GS education could overtake 
authors with the same publication output but without the corresponding GS capital. The 
maximum amount of the overtaking depends on the weighting percentage: with +10% / capital 
type, a maximum jump of 11 places were found, while with +20% / capital type it was 22 
places. It means, for example, that after a GS20 weighting, candidate B on the 50th place of the 
NORM shortlist could actually overtake candidate A who was on the 29th place in spite of the 
fact that candidate A has much more Scopus-indexed publications. Waves on the curve refer to 
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As demonstrated here in the cases of all weighted calculations, position shifting was the most 
characteristic for the most competitive positions. It means that weighting with education as 
science capital can be meaningful and even determining in the case of the high performing 
academics, and its significance is only marginal if not indifferent for their less excellent peers.  
Finally, when the calculation correlates the weighted calculation to not the normal form 
(NORM) but to each other (GN to GS calculations), very significant modifications could be 
seen in the ranking of the candidates. Fig 4 shows the most extreme setting when GN20 to 
GS20 were compared. Data show that position changes are extraordinary frequent when GN20 
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These results definitely confirm the hypothesis that if the GN-weighted calculation had been 
replaced with its GS-weighted variant, the rank of candidates would significantly transform and 
it will give a chance to very productive GS educated applicants (H1). It can be seen in Fig 4 
that there are several position changes on the top 100 list of applicants when the weighting was 
changed, and the most dramatic changes occur at the top of the ranking. While the verification 
of H1 is not an empirical proof in a sense that it does not prove that the modified list is better 
in an objective sense, this paper has two arguments for the assumption that this new, modified 
list where GS education is favored is more reasonable than the opposite that shows favor to GN 
educated scholars. First, since this current paper holds the view that GN education already 
influences scientific production positively, therefore it should not be counted apart. Second, 
one could also suggest within reason that GS authors with the same publication output are more 
prosperous (in the sense of future productivity) than GN educated competitors with the same 
productivity since they made the same production with less capital. A GN affiliation would 
boost the productivity of a GS educated candidate in a much bigger extent than that of a GN 
educated academic because this latter is already familiar with GN knowledge (GN academic 





Data show that there is no general rule suggesting that GN education will necessarily lead to 
better performance in terms of science production. In spite of this, in most cases, excellence in 
education (in the form of GN BA, MA or Ph.D.) serves as a surplus capital in the eyes of 
selection committee members. To assess the possible roles that capital play in the production 
of academics, this paper should briefly highlight the differences between academic capital and 
academic production again. In accordance with the Bourdieusian conception, capital is some 
implementation of knowledge which could contribute to the publication success of a given 
academic. In this current case, if GN capital (in the form of BA, MA and Ph.D. degrees from 









1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94
GN20  GS20
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number of Scopus-indexed articles. Nevertheless, as it could be seen from the results, GN 
education of GS scholars does not lead automatically to a boosting in their science publication 
output.  
So one can ask: in what sense could be said that GN education should be conceived as 
academic capital and should be added to the scientific production of a given candidate as a 
surplus? Why research committees have to overvalue candidates with elite degrees when their 
science output is not better than their peer candidates with GS education? In accordance with 
the three variations of measurement of this paper (NORM, GN+10/20, GS+10/20), three 
arguments could be constructed regarding the assessment of science production.  
The first and simplest argument is that one should not count BA, MA and Ph.D. degrees at 
all, because they are either incorporated in science production in form of a higher number of 
articles or they are irrelevant regarding science output. The normal measurement (NORM) 
shows a calculation of this kind, where the productivity of the candidates equals the number of 
their Scopus-indexed articles irrespectively from their education history. In this case, selection 
committees would select the most productive candidates while neglecting their education 
history. This type of calculation could assume that GN education is a form of academic capital, 
but it also assumes that it should be incorporated into the publication output. With this, the 
calculation hypothesizes that the productivity of author A with GN education would be lower 
without her GN education, and, consequently, it should also assume that author B with GS 
education might perform better if she had a GN education instead. Without the above-
mentioned assumptions, one should suppose that education does not matter at all, which is 
counterintuitive and contradict to our conception of academic capital.  
In this stage of the argumentation, the paper should refer again to the connections between 
academic capital, production, and productivity. In most cases, capital is conceived as means of 
tools, knowledge, and courses of action that positively effects on productivity. But capital is 
always expensive to accumulate, in terms of both time and financial sources. One might ask 
which worker is more productive: the one producing a given amount of product with more 
capital or the one producing the same amount of product with less capital? It is beyond question, 
that the second one, so, in the case of equal production, workers with less capital are more 
productive than those with more capital. This finding will be very important later when the 
assessment of the calculation methods will be taken.  
The second and most commonly used calculation is when GN education is added to the 
production of the candidate as a surplus of academic capital (GN10 and GN20). Since most 
selection committees prefer candidates with GN education history, one can hypothesize that 
this is the most typical way of calculating the productivity or the general academic value of a 
candidate. Of course, the exact algorithms by which selection committee members weight the 
productivity of the candidates are unknown, but data show that even as little as 10% surplus 
per GN degrees could lead to significant differences regarding the positions of the candidates. 
Calculations of this kind would eventuate a ranking of applicants where GN educated 
candidates with less publication success could easily take the lead over GS authors with 
significantly more publications. As a foundational idea behind this calculation one could find 
the assumption that GN education is a very important academic capital, so GN experience has 
to be added to the publication output as a surplus, as an extra value of a given candidate’s 
productivity. But one can easily contradict to the plausibility of this method. Suppose that GN 
education could be conceived as academic capital. Then, it means better training, better 
knowledge transmission and it also includes acquiring better familiarity with research methods, 
academic writing and publication habits. If GN education is a sort of advanced guarantee for 
research excellence, then one could assume that candidates with GN education will perform 
better than their GS educated peers. In this case, their GN academic capital will be expressed 
in their publication output; not as a surplus that should be added to their productivity indices 
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but as one of the causes of these attractive indices. If GN education is capital then a candidate 
A with 10 Scopus-indexed articles is someone who published 10 articles owing the fact, at least 
partly, that she has been educated in a GN institution. When selection committees add extra 
points to her production (expressed in the number of her articles) then they count the very same 
thing (her GN education) twice, which is not just unethical but deliberately unreasonable. Still, 
most tenure committees do the very same calculations.  
The third and last calculations show favor towards candidates with GS education but not 
because of some fairness or GS quota, but because of the connection between capital and 
production. These candidates have reached given productivity in spite of the fact that they do 
not have GN academic capital, therefore – based on this calculation – they have to be promoted 
against GN educated candidates with the same productivity. The explanation here is the same 
that this paper has already mentioned: if two candidates have the same amount of production 
(in our case: the same publication output) then the candidates with less capital perform better. 
Even a slight weighting could rearrange the ranking of candidates: if one weights 10% / GS 
degree, some candidates could go up by 10 positions, and it could grow up to 22 positions with 
20% / GS degree weighting. Note, that these numbers were calculated against the NORM 
calculation; when we compare the GN 20 ranking with the GS 20 ranking, position changes 
could go up to 40 places. If the fact that most selection committees use GN-favoring weighting 
is considered, one could realize that a more just and reasonable calculation which is GS-
weighted could significantly affect if not subvert the selection process.  
One could say, however, that in the case of this last calculation that favors GS education, 
it is no use being educated at the GN at all – which is absurd. In answer to this posing one could 
say, on the one hand, that since it is decidedly thought that GN education is a valid academic 
capital, it is also suggested that GN education would manifest itself in increased publication 
output if the candidates with this GN education are talented enough. Thus, GS-favored 
calculation will hit only those GN educated candidates that perform badly despite their extant 
academic capital, namely, their GN education. On the other hand, the calculations performed 
in this paper were related to early-career candidates. On later stages of assessment, one could 
calculate other factors as well, like GN/GS postdoctoral positions, research grants, fellowships 
or affiliations. Since one could rightfully assume that most successful candidates that apply for 
positions at GN institutions will have GN capital in form of GN fellowships or affiliations later 
in their course of a career, their GS-weighted productivity indices will be more balanced 
because future committees will calculate with their later-stage GN capital. Thus the GS-
weighted calculation appears to be fair for early career researchers and for their senior peers, 
too.  For early-career researchers, the calculation would balance educational inequalities by 
overvaluing GS education in case of a great number of publications; and, for senior scholars, 
these overvaluations of former GS academics will be balanced by the fact that they will get, 





Despite the assumptions held by most scholars of academic personnel selection, this current 
analysis has not found any general rule by which GN education necessarily raises science 
output of GS authors: there were no significant correlations between GN education and the 
number of Scopus-indexed articles.  It is still presupposed, however, that GN academic 
experience could be considered as a form of academic capital, but this paper proposes that it 
should be measured on the level of the individual candidates in a form of weighted calculation 
of their productivity measures.  Since GN education is usually considered as an extra value, as 
an academic surplus, selection committees usually score candidates with GN education with 
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extra points. This paper argued that this is a slightly unethical and unreasonable practice since 
it duplicates the value of GN education. First, it is considered as the extra value in itself, and 
second, it is incorporated in the raised publication output, too. Moreover, the overvaluation of 
GN education leads automatically to the undervaluation of GS education which hits most 
frequently those candidates from the GS.  It means that, in the case of equal production, current 
selection system would decide on the basis of GN/GS education in favor of the GN.  It is 
possible to argue that the underestimation of GS academics on the ground of they are educated 
at the GS is not less unfair than the underestimation of women or different minority groups by 
reason of they are who they are. If the global job market in general, and the world of the global 
academy, in particular, want to act as a field of merit-based work, they should chuck up their 
preconceptions against GS educated candidates just as they started to abandon the prejudices 
against women, ethnic groups and LGBTQ people. With this, the global academy might give a 
good example to other fields of social life like politics, economy, education and any kinds of 
global collaboration that are subject to international power relations. 
This paper maintained the idea that GN education is valuable for GS scholars, not in itself, 
but because it presumably leads to research excellence that would be manifested in high 
publication output. Knowing this, one could assume that GN educated candidates would 
publish less without their GN experience, and GS educated authors would publish more with 
GN education. This assumption follows directly from the conception of GN education as a 
source of scientific capital which results in a boosted productivity. Because of the above-
mentioned considerations, one can conclude that assessments with GN weighting even deepen 
the gap of inequality and strengthen the bias against GS educated candidates by counting GN 
capital twice and by adding it to science productivity. As it has been mentioned formerly, in 
the case of equal production, candidates with less capital (GS education) are more productive 
than those with more capital (GN education). Therefore, calculation practices that premiate GN 
education on the level of science output misunderstand the sensible connections between 
academic capital and productivity.  
Of course, this paper does not argue that education, and especially GN education could not 
be regarded as a value in itself. There is a lot to say about the advantages of GN education. To 
name a few: students could learn international English, GN standards of research and academic 
communication, they could participate in GN academic networks and so on. But the question 
is: how could selection committees measure these values if not in terms of science output? It is 
not a random fact that university rankings like the Times Higher Education World University 
Ranking, the QS World University Ranking or the ARWU calculate with the publication output 
of university or department staffs (and not with their education history). In other words: while 
GN education could be conceived as a source of many different and important values; in order 
to be measurable, it should be manifested in measurable variables that is science output.   
Hence, the final conclusion is that –  as opposed with the most widespread practices – selection 
committees have better premiate GS educated candidates if they have equal publication output 
with their GN educated competitors since those GS educated scholars in question made the 
same production with less capital, so, they are more productive. Since one should not 
underestimate the role of GN institutions as academic capital, selection committees have good 
reasons to presume that the productivity of GS authors will further improve after they get a GN 
affiliation, because this newly gained capital will be added to their already realized productivity 
measures. By contrast, a similar amount of improvement could not be expected from GN 
educated candidates since this kind of academic capital has been already incorporated in their 
current productivity. This present analysis suggests, therefore, that the most rewarding 
investment for a GN institution is to hire GS educated candidates with very high research 
output.  
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